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Abstract
A popular way to encourage user actions or contributions in a
service are the widely adopted incentives schemes. They represent
schemes in which users are offered certain benefits or reputation
in return for their actions. However, these systems rely on service
providers to manage users’ profiles, which record all the activity of
the users, the benefits they are entitled to and/or reputation. The
service provider thus holds a vast amount of user’s private informa-
tion, even when the user is only known by a pseudonym. In order to
address this issue, we present a privacy-preserving incentives scheme
that allows earning and redeeming incentives in an unlinkable way.
Furthermore, the incentives do not have to be linked to a specific
action for which they were issued or to the identity or pseudonym
of the user who has earned them. Still, it is possible for the users to
prove ownership of the incentives and the service provider is able to
verify their validity. The described approach is also efficient and the
provided experimental evaluation demonstrates that it is suitable for
usage on a mobile device, such as a smartphone.
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Abstract
A popular way to encourage user actions or contributions
in a service are the widely adopted incentives schemes.
They represent schemes in which users are offered cer-
tain benefits or reputation in return for their actions.
However, these systems rely on service providers to man-
age users’ profiles, which record all the activity of the
users, the benefits they are entitled to and/or reputation.
The service provider thus holds a vast amount of user’s
private information, even when the user is only known by
a pseudonym. In order to address this issue, we present a
privacy-preserving incentives scheme that allows earning
and redeeming incentives in an unlinkable way. Further-
more, the incentives do not have to be linked to a spe-
cific action for which they were issued or to the identity
or pseudonym of the user who has earned them. Still,
it is possible for the users to prove ownership of the in-
centives and the service provider is able to verify their
validity. The described approach is also efficient and the
provided experimental evaluation demonstrates that it is
suitable for usage on a mobile device, such as a smart-
phone.
1 Introduction
Incentives schemes such as loyalty systems have been
traditionally used for enhancing customer relationship.
Their original purpose was to reward loyalty in retailing
systems, in order to increase the rate of returning cus-
tomers. Today, their scopes have widened and their pur-
poses have become less transparent. Loyalty schemes
are so widespread that almost any commercial business,
such as retailing, airline, or credit companies, has its own
loyalty program. These schemes are also popular among
customers. For example, a US survey [2] shows that
the average household is signed up for 14 loyalty pro-
grams, ranging from grocery stores and gas stations to
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airlines and hotels, while actively participating in almost
half of them. Many community-based services also rely
on incentives scheme. Waze [3], a traffic and navigation
service, provides participating users with points that are
used to draw up a ranking going from Waze baby to Waze
royalty. In FourSquare [1], users can earn points, badges
or even discounts by checking in at different places. In
these systems, the incentives scheme especially stimu-
lates the users to participate more and earn a reputation
towards their friends or other users.
Early incentives systems were based on paper cards
stamped by the retailer during checkout. Although not
very practical, as one had to make sure to bring along the
card at each visit, it was certainly a very privacy-friendly
system: there was no central user account. Today, these
paper cards are replaced by plastic cards or tokens which
contain a unique customer identifier. During checkout, a
user presents her card to earn her loyalty points. How-
ever, both loyalty points and the purchase details are
recorded by the provider in a central account, which in-
troduces severe privacy concerns. Even if customers pro-
vide false registration information or pseudonyms, pow-
erful data-mining techniques can be used to reveal their
identities and sensitive information [23, 22, 6]. Unfortu-
nately, most customers are unaware of the amount of data
collected about them and have only limited or no control
over it. As a result, providers often misuse this infor-
mation. Providers may even monetize this customer data
and sell it to third parties, allowing for merging multiple
databases. Consequently, customers have been showing
increasing concerns about these threats against their pri-
vacy. A recent survey shows that almost 30% of par-
ticipants believe that too much personal information is
requested by incentives systems and 24% chose not to
enrol with them for privacy reasons [15].
In this paper, we propose a new efficient and
privacy-protecting incentives scheme, uCentive. In this
scheme, users create anonymous sessions with the ser-
vice provider to earn and redeem unlinkable incentives,
uCents. Therefore, while users still require an account
with the provider, their activities and uCents cannot be
associated with their accounts. uCentive also binds the
uCents to their legitimate owners, so that they cannot be
shared with other users if the provider does not allow
it. This property also makes uCents theft-resistant, as
an adversary cannot redeem stolen uCents without the
corresponding user’s secret. If the provider allows it,
our scheme also offers a protocol for transferring uCents
among users. Moreover, once a uCent has been re-
deemed, it cannot be linked to its owner, even if the
owner’s secrets are compromised. We refer to this prop-
erty as perfect forward unlinkability.
uCentive relies on well-known cryptographic build-
ing blocks such as: anonymous credentials (i.e.
Idemix), zero-knowledge proofs, commitment schemes
and partially-blind signatures. Still, our experimental
evaluation demonstrates that uCentive is efficient to run
in mobile devices such as smartphones. For example,
earning and redeeming 1 uCent required on average
154.23 and 207.88 ms respectively on an off-the-shelf
Android smartphone. We also provide optimizations that
can reduce uCentive’s protocols execution time without
security or privacy risks.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows:
• We present the design of a flexible and privacy-
protecting incentives scheme. The scheme cleverly
combines well-established building blocks, is de-
signed for smartphone use and does not pose any
additional hardware requirements.
• We show that the scheme is very versatile and can
support many advanced scenarios. The scheme also
provides perfect forward unlinkability.
• We discuss the performance of a prototype of
the system which has been implemented on an
Android-based smartphone. We show that the pre-
sented scheme is very efficient.
• A Java-library for the scheme has been made pub-
licly available.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: In Sec-
tion 2 we introduce our targeted incentives scenarios
and their requirements. In Section 3 we provide a brief
description of the cryptographic building blocks used
in our design and in Section 4 we present uCentive’s
threat model, design and properties. We then show
how uCentive can be integrated in our targeted incen-
tive scenarios in Section 5. Next, Section 6 describes the
uCentive’s implementation details and its experimental
evaluation. Section 7 analyses uCentive’s privacy and se-
curity properties and possible design extensions. Finally,
Section 8 discusses the related work done in the area of
security and privacy of incentive systems and Section 9
presents our concluding remarks.
2 Targeted Scenarios
In this paper, we focus on the privacy and security prob-
lems of two types of incentives systems: customer loy-
alty systems and reputation systems for online communi-
ties. In general, the goal of these systems is to encourage
users to perform certain actions in exchange of incentives
or rewards. However, while these actions benefit a par-
ticular provider or community, they often reveal a great
amount of personally identifiable information. Such in-
formation is often collected (and misused) by providers
or other third-parties without users’ knowledge and/or
consent.
Loyalty systems are a popular service used by service
providers to measure and reward customers’ loyalty. In
general, customers enrolled in these programs receive
a loyalty card, typically a plastic card or token with a
unique identifier that points to the customer’s profile in
the provider’s database. As a result, all the customer
transactions or actions are associated with her profile. In
addition, given the increasing popularity and capabilities
of mobile devices such as smartphones, more and more
providers and third-parties are offering mobile apps to
help customers to manage their loyalty points and access
more advanced functionality. This approach, however,
allows providers to collect even more private data about
their customers.
Similar privacy issues are present in reputation sys-
tems for online communities. These systems are a com-
mon way to establish a form of trustworthiness in an en-
vironment where users are mutually unknown. However,
in order to build a reputation, the users establish either
an identifiable or a pseudonymous relationship with the
service provider. This allows linking and recording all
user actions that define the reputation. An example are
applications for exchanging driving and traffic informa-
tion such as Waze [3]. The users establish a long-term
pseudonym with the service provider and all actions they
perform are linked to it. The collected points are derived
from the performed actions, such as posting information
about the traffic or modifying the recorded road maps.
The collected number of points is reflected in the level
of their reputation, which is evident to other users. Still,
while the reported information benefits the Waze com-
munity, users need to reveal their location and driving
patterns to Waze’s owners (i.e., Google). Even if users
register with a pseudonym, it is relatively easy to reveal
their identities from their driving patterns and other data
collected [14].
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In this work, our goal is to solve the privacy prob-
lems described above by designing and implementing a
scheme that allows users to earn and redeem incentives
that are anonymous and unlinkable by design; thus, al-
lowing users to take advantage of incentive systems with-
out sacrificing their privacy.
3 Preliminaries
This section provides an overview of the cryptographic
building blocks utilised in the proposed protocols.
• Commitments. Commitment schemes allow an en-
tity to commit to a set of values while keeping them
secret. A common analogy for these schemes are
sealed, non-transparent envelopes. When a commit-
ment is issued to a verifier, the user cannot change
the values she committed to, without this being de-
tectable by the verifier. The commitment hides the
values chosen by the user, but still allows for prov-
ing certain properties of the committed values.
For committing to a value, we assume usage of the
Pedersen commitment scheme [24]. Thus, for a
group G of prime order q and generators g1 and g2
∈G, the user commits to a message m, by choosing
random value r and computing the commitment:
C = gm1 × gr2.
• Partially blind signatures. These signature
schemes allow to sign a data structure, parts of
which are not disclosed to the signer. They are an
extension of the concept of blind signatures, where
the contents of a message that is signed are com-
pletely hidden from the signer [13]. In the partially
blind signature scheme (PBS), it is possible for the
receiver (R) and the signer of the hidden message
(S) to agree on some public information, that is also
included in the signed structure [4]:
PBSig← PBSign(public; hiddenR; skS).
For more details see Appendix A.
• Zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. Crypto-
graphic proofs of knowledge are proofs in which
one party, the prover, proves to a verifier that she
knows certain values or secrets [7]. With zero-
knowledge proofs of knowledge (ZKPK), a prover
can convince a verifier that a certain statement is
true, without revealing any additional information.
In the proposed protocols, we utilise a signature
proof of knowledge, which additionally allows the
prover to sign a message when creating the proof of
knowledge. For a public value y and a private value
x, such that y = gx, and for a message m, we denote
the signed proof of knowledge of value x with:
SPK{(x): y=gx}(m).
• Anonymous credentials. This type of digital cre-
dentials allows for authentication of users in a
privacy-preserving manner. This technology offers
selective disclosure of attributes, i.e. disclosing
chosen attributes contained in a credential, while
hiding the others. Additionally, it is possible to only
prove properties of the embedded attributes, with-
out disclosing the actual values. For instance, they
allow a person to prove she is older than 18, with-
out revealing the birthdate embedded in the creden-
tial. Zero-knowledge proofs are used to prove pos-
session of a valid credential issued by a certificate
issuer and also to prove properties of the embed-
ded attributes. This type of digital credentials can
also provide accountability, even though the trans-
actions can be anonymous. In this case, the user
will provide the relying party a verifiable encryp-
tion of her identity and prove that the correct value
is encrypted. In case of proven abuse, the trusted
third party that owns the private key to decrypt the
verifiable encryption, can deanonymise the user.
There are two well known anonymous credential
systems. With Idemix [12] multiple credential
shows do not have to be linkable, and with UProve
[9] the user needs to be issued multiple credentials
in order to avoid linkability.
4 The uCentive scheme
This section describes the privacy-friendly incentives
system, denoted as uCentive. The proposed scheme al-
lows unlinkable and anonymous transactions of incen-
tives, which are represented as uCents. A user is issued
with an incentive by obtaining a uCent. This is a signed
structure that contains details about the incentive and a
link with the intended owner. It authorises its owner to
claim the specified benefits. The details about the incen-
tive include information such as its value, but also limita-
tions on the incentive usage, such as its expiration. This
allows the providers to utilise uCentive for multiple in-
centive schemes deployed in parallel with configurable
policies.
4.1 Threat model
In our threat model, we consider three types of adver-
saries: malicious users, malicious service providers and
external adversaries. Malicious users may try to earn
or redeem uCents unlawfully. For this purpose, they
may try to perform different attacks such as: forging
new uCents or modifying existent ones (e.g. changing
their value or ownership); double-spending their uCents;
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stealing other users’ credentials, secrets or uCents; ille-
gally sharing their uCents or credentials with other users
and earning uCents for other users. Malicious service
providers may try to break the privacy guarantees offered
by uCentive. For example, a provider may try to dis-
cover a user’s identity by analysing messages exchanged
during a transaction or by trying to link different trans-
actions and using data mining techniques. A malicious
provider may also perform active attacks such as issu-
ing uCents with unique values or epochs. External ad-
versaries (i.e. entities which are not participants of the
uCentive scheme), may also try to break the privacy or
security guarantees offered by uCentive. Examples are
eavesdropping the communications between users and
the service provider or active attacks, such as injection
of messages.
Our thread model assumes that, for most scenarios,
uCentive’s transactions have low to medium value, as
this is true for incentives schemes in general. In ad-
dition, we do not consider reverse engineering attacks
against applications using uCentive, denial of service at-
tacks or application-level attacks that may allow adver-
saries to earn uCents illegally, i.e. without performing
the required action.
4.2 System overview
All the protocols of uCentive are executed between the
service provider (SP) and the users (U). The protocols
that comprise the proposed scheme are listed and ex-
plained in this subsection.
For representing the interaction between two or more
parties Pi, we utilise the following notation:
P1 ↔ P2 ↔ P3 : (OP1 ; OP2 ; OP3 )←
Protocol(IP1 ; IP2 ; IP3 ),
where IPi and OPi respectively represent the input and the
output of the protocol for party Pi.
A uCent denotes a structure comprised of a commit-
ment to a secret value from the user’s credential, the
opening information, details on the incentive and the
provider’s signature: uCent = {C, r, info, PBSig}.
The scheme consists of the following protocols:
• User registration:
U↔ I : (CredU ; ID∗U )← Register(IDU ; skI).
User U registers with her identity IDU and obtains
an anonymous credential CredU , signed by the is-
suer I. The issuer learns some attributes of the user
(ID∗U ) in the process.
• Anonymous session establishment:
U↔ SP : (Nymses; Nymses)←
EstablishSession(CredU ; /0).
For interaction with the service provider SP, user
U anonymously authenticates, proving only that
she holds a valid anonymous credential issued
by a trusted issuer and generating a new session
pseudonym, Nymses.
• Earning uCents:
U ↔ SP : ({uCent}; /0)←
Earn(CredU ; {incentive}, skSP).
For earning uCents, a user is issued with partially
blind signatures on commitments to a secret value
from her credential and the details of the incentives.
• Redemption of uCents:
U ↔ SP : ( /0; {uCent∗})←
Redeem({uCent}, CredU ; pkSP).
For every redeemed uCent, the user shows a part
of the uCent-structure, uCent∗, and proves that it is
linked to her credential, by proving that they both
contain the same secret value.
• Transfer of uCents:
UR ↔ US ↔ SP : ({uCentR}; /0; {uCent∗S})←
Transfer(CredR; {uCentS}, CredS; skSP).
A user can also transfer uCents to another user, if
the service provider allows this kind of exchange.
The sending user US authorises another user UR to
use the incentives offered by the uCents she holds,
by initially redeeming the earned uCents and having
them reissued for the receiving user UR.
The following subsections describe the protocols in
more detail. Earning, redemption and transfer of uCents
is described for a single uCent, from which the expan-
sion to multiple uCents is straightforward. The evalua-
tion of the design addressing the described threat model
is presented in Section 7.
Assumptions. We assume that the system has been
properly initialized, and that the parameters and public
keys have been made available to all the involved parties:
the public key of the credential issuer, the parameters of
the Idemix system and the parameters of the PBS-scheme
(including the parameters of the commitment scheme).
We also assume that other transactions performed in
the same session (e.g. payments) or the used network
protocols do not introduce linkabilities.
4.3 Detailed description
User registration. All the users of uCentive initially
need to obtain an anonymous credential from a trusted
issuer. This can be the service provider itself, or other
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trusted authorities, such as governmental credential issu-
ing bodies. The anonymous credentials allow the users to
anonymously or pseudonymously interact with any party
that trusts the issuer. Additionally, the credentials con-
tain a secret value, denoted as uCentive secret, which is
created through interaction with the issuer, but is known
only to the credential holder.
Note that the issuance can be performed at the site of
the issuer, or remotely, through an online service using
e.g. electronic ID for proving the personal attributes to
be included in the anonymous credential. In order to
achieve the unlinkability of user actions, users are issued
with Idemix credentials [12], which allow them to estab-
lish unlinkable sessions with the same service provider.
Interested users would initially contact and establish a
secure connection with a trusted credential issuing party.
They would possibly need to prove some personal infor-
mation. The user also chooses a random number to be
included in her credential, but sends only a commitment
to it, so that the issuing party cannot learn its value. The
issuer applies a random offset to this value and the result
represents the uCentive secret (ucs), which is known to
the user, but remains hidden from the issuer. This value
will be used to link the received value token to the user in
an anonymous way. Optionally, the master secret, which
is an already existing secret value of the credential, could
be utilised as ucs. However, we prefer to use a separate
secret value in order to reduce the likelihood of leaking
information about the master secret and also for flexibil-
ity reasons, such as allowing the user to update the ucs,
to have different secret values for different providers, or
to share that secret value in family loyalty schemes. Fi-
nally, the user is issued with an anonymous credential
which records her personal information, the ucs and pos-
sibly a serial number chosen by the issuer.
Session establishment. When users initiate the inter-
action with the service provider in order to be issued
with uCents, they anonymously prove that they possess
the required anonymous credential, but by default do not
disclose any other information contained in the creden-
tial. This results in a session pseudonym Nymses and only
provides assurance to the service provider that the user is
registered as a participant in the uCentive scheme. This
is an Idemix domain pseudonym, which depends on the
service provider’s identity and a timestamp (or in some
use cases, a time period). Therefore, different sessions of
the same user cannot be linked by matching pseudonyms.
It is also possible for a service provider to limit the in-
centives that are issued to a user in a period of time.
Establishing the pseudonym based on the current time
frame disallows the users to re-establish a session with a
provider and obtain incentives for redundant actions they
perform.
Earning uCents. The detailed protocol for earning
uCents is represented in Table 1. In a nutshell, the ser-
vice provider determines the details of the incentive to
be awarded, among which its value. It is also possible
to specify other details, such as the epoch in which the
uCent is issued or any other specification and/or restric-
tion, such as the name of the incentive scheme or expira-
tion information. However, the details should be general
enough, as a unique specification would allow linking
the issuance to the redemption of a uCent. The user then
commits to the uCentive secret from her credential, and
engages with the service provider in the partially blind
signing protocol [4]. This allows the service provider to
sign the user commitment and the incentive’s details, so
that the latter is transparent and can be verified, while
the user’s commitment remains undisclosed. This signed
structure together with the opening information of the
commitment is denoted as a uCent. It authorises the user,
i.e. the owner of the anonymous credential, to use the
specified benefits.
The detailed interaction with the service provider con-
sists of the following steps:
(1) The service provider initially provides the user with
the details of the incentive, info. This information
includes details such as the value of the incentive
and the current epoch and other data that can be
used to impose limitations to the usage of the in-
centive. If the incentives that are issued have indis-
criminate value number, issuing singular numbers
would disclose the link between the redeeming and
the earning session. Therefore, an incentive value
is divided into predefined denominations, which are
issued to the user in separate uCents.
(2) The user then generates a random number, r to be
used for committing to the uCentive secret (ucs)
contained in the anonymous credential.
(3) In the next step, the user creates a commitment to
the secret value:
C← Commit(ucs, r) = gucs × hr.
The commitment is used to bind the the issued
uCent to the user’s credential, while hiding the ucs
throughout the lifetime of the uCent.
(4) The user and the service provider then engage in
an interactive protocol for creating a partially blind
signature on the user commitment C and info. The
public input to the protocol is info, while the com-
mitment of the user remains hidden from the service
provider:
(PBSig; /0)← PBSign(C; info, skSP).
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(uCent; /0)← Earn(CredU ; info, skSP)
(1) U← SP : info
(2) U : r R←−Zq; ucs = CredU .ucs
(3) U : C← Commit(ucs, r)
(4) U↔ SP : (PBSig; /0)← PBSign(C; info,skSP)
(5) U : Store(uCent = {C, r, info, PBSig})
Table 1: Protocol for earning uCents: The user interacts
with the service provider in order to collect uCents in an
anonymous and unlinkable way.
( /0; uCent∗)← Redeem(uCent, CredU ; pkSP)
(1) U← SP : rn $←−{0, 1}ln
(2) U : (C, r, info, PBSig)← Load(uCent)
(3) U : pi ← SPK{(ucs, r): C = gucs × hr
∧C.ucs= CredU .ucs}(rn)
(4) U→ SP : C, info, PBSig, pi
(5) SP : if (! Verify(PBSig, C, info,
pi,rn,pkSP))Abort
(6) SP : Store(C, info)
(7) U : Delete(uCent)
Table 2: Protocol for redemption of uCents: The user in-
teracts with the service provider in order to redeem the
collected benefits, while hiding the link between the re-
deemed uCents and the sessions in which they were is-
sued by the provider.
It is necessary to utilise the partially blind signature
scheme, as the user needs to disclose the commit-
ment at redemption time in order to prove the link
to her credential.
(5) Finally, the user stores the resulting signature,
PBSig, commitment C with its opening information
r and the related information info. This data is col-
lectively denoted as a uCent.
In the described protocol, when a uCent is issued, the
provider cannot verify the link between the used com-
mitment and the communicating user. This means that
the user does not prove that the commitments contain the
correct ucs (i.e. the one that is included in her creden-
tial). Hence, she could commit to the ucs of another user,
to whom she forwards the earned uCents. This verifica-
tion is not provided in the basic flavour of the protocol, as
the blinding of the commitment in the partially blind sig-
nature scheme does not allow proving properties about
it. However, it is possible to introduce this assurance for
the service provider by augmenting the protocol with a
cut-and-choose method (cfr. Sec 7).
Redeeming uCents. When a user wishes to redeem a
previously earned uCent in order to obtain certain ben-
efits, she discloses the partially blind signature, the cor-
responding commitment and incentive details info to the
service provider (Table 2). Additionally, she provides
proofs that she knows the secret and the opening value
of the commitment and proves that the uCentive secret in
her anonymous credential was used to create the com-
mitment. After verifying the validity of the signature
and the proofs of knowledge, the provider also checks
the related information, such as the applicability of the
epoch, and whether the commitment has already been
used. The provider maintains a database where used
commitments are recorded with the applicable epoch.
When the user wishes to utilise the uCents she holds,
the provider checks this database in order to verify that
the presented commitment has not been used before. In
case of successful checks, the provider allows the user to
collect the appropriate benefits.
The detailed steps are as follows:
(1) For every uCent to be redeemed, the service
provider sends a random nonce rn to the user in or-
der to prevent precomputation of proofs.
(2) The user initially loads the stored commitment, C,
its opening value r, the signature PBSig, and the re-
lated information info.
(3) The user then creates zero-knowledge proofs of
knowledge of the correct formation of the commit-
ment, and the link with the anonymous credential
she owns, i.e. that the committed value corresponds
to the credential’s uCentive secret, and signs the
random nonce with the credential. This ensures that
only the user who was the intended receiver of the
benefits can redeem them.
pi ← SPK{(ucs, r): C = gucs × hr ∧
C.ucs= CredU .ucs}(rn).
(4) The service provider is then presented with the
commitment with accompanying signed informa-
tion, the partially blind signature, and the proofs of
knowledge.
(5) The authenticity of the presented uCent is verified
by checking the validity of the presented informa-
tion:
if (! Verify(PBSig, C, info, pi,rn,pkSP)) Abort,
which includes the following checks:
• The verification of the accompanying infor-
mation. This can include checks such as the
validity of the epoch.
• The validity of the signature and the proofs of
knowledge.
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(uCentR; /0; uCentS)← Transfer(CredR; uCentS, CredS; skSP)
(1) UR : rR
R←−Zq, CR ← Commit(ucsR, rR)
(2) US ← UR : CR
(3) US ↔ SP : ( /0; uCentS)← Redeem( /0; uCentS, CredS; pkSP)
(4) US ↔ SP : (PBSigCR ; /0)← PBSign(info∗; CR; skSP)
(5) US : Delete(uCentS)
(6) US → UR : PBSigCR , info∗
(7) UR : Store(uCentR = {CR, rR, info∗, PBSigCR})
Table 3: Protocol for transferring a uCent from a sender US to a receiver UR: The receiving user discloses a commit-
ment to the sending user. The sending user redeems previously earned uCentS and provides the service provider with
the receiver’s commitment, in order to have the incentives reissued in the uCentR.
• Double spending (by querying the database of
spent commitments for a match with the pre-
sented commitment).
If any of the checks fails, the protocol is aborted.
To improve the protocol performance and save re-
sources, the checks are sorted by computational
complexity starting from least computationally ex-
pensive.
(6) Finally, in case of successful verifications, the user
is authorised to claim the benefits of the presented
uCents. The service provider records the used com-
mitments and the related info, in order to prevent
double-spending of the redeemed uCents. Once the
epoch becomes invalid and the uCents obtained in
that epoch expire, the provider can delete the corre-
sponding entries from the storage.
(7) After redeeming a uCent, it is deleted from the
user’s storage, in order to ensure perfect forward
unlinkability (cfr. Sec 7).
Transfer of uCents. Besides the user–service provider
interaction for obtaining or redeeming uCents, the sys-
tem allows transfer of incentives between users. This is
useful for systems where users build reputation based on
tokens awarded by other users, or for systems that need
to support transferring some incentives to other users.
If the provider allows the inter–user transfer of uCents,
it can be achieved as follows. The sender initially ob-
tains a commitment value from the receiver and engages
in the protocol with the service provider for re-issuing
the uCents for the receiver (Table 3). This includes re-
demption of the earned uCents of the sender and issuing
new ones linked to the commitment of the receiver.
The protocol for transfering uCents consists of the fol-
lowing steps:
(1) The receiving user initially generates a random
value rR to be used for creating a commitment to
her uCentive secret (ucsR). The commitments are
created by computing:
CR ← Commit(ucsR, r).
(2) The sender is then presented with the receiver’s
commitment for which a uCent should be issued.
(3) In the next step, the sender engages in the redemp-
tion protocol with the service provider to prove pos-
session of her uCent:
uCentS = {CS, rS info, PBSigS}.
(4) Following the redemption, the protocol for issuing
partially blind signature on the receiver commit-
ment is executed. The service provider can at this
point adapt the info details, for instance by reducing
the awarded value, creating info∗.
(5) The sender can then delete the redeemed uCent, in
order to ensure perfect forward unlinkability of her
interactions (Section 7).
(6) The partially blind signature and related informa-
tion are sent to the receiver.
(7) Finally, the receiver stores the information that
comprises the uCentR.
This protocol allows the service provider to impose an
exchange policy between the users, such as in the Air
Miles loyalty system. The users collect the incentives in
the form of reward miles, which can be exchanged for
benefits such as discounts. However, granting another
user the right to use the earned miles is subject to a fee,
so the receiver earns only a percentage of the redeemed
miles. This is possible with the presented scheme, as
the service provider can re-issue the redeemed miles to
another user with a changed value information, or issue
a smaller number of uCents then were redeemed.
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4.4 System properties
The proposed scheme is designed to achieve the follow-
ing properties:
• Unlinkability of different interactions for the earn-
ing and redemption of uCents.
• Perfect forward unlinkabilty, meaning that compro-
mising the user credential cannot link the user to her
previous interactions within uCentive.
• Theft resistance, which prevents claiming unlaw-
fully obtained uCents of another user.
• Double-spending prevention, ensuring that incen-
tives linked to one uCent can only be claimed once.
• Unforgeability of uCents, so that it is not possible
for the users to create valid uCents at will.
• Providers’ control over incentives utilisation, which
allows them to impose terms of use on the issued
incentives, such as a validity period.
• Flexibility, which ensures applicability to a wide
range of services based on issuance, claiming or
transfer of different kinds of properties.
5 Use Cases
The uCentive scheme can be utilised in a variety of ap-
plications for issuing incentives, building reputation or
exchange of other value tokens. In this section we detail
two possible use cases of the proposed system, namely
the application in a loyalty system scenario and in rep-
utation system for online community-based road maps
and traffic application.
5.1 Loyalty system
In order to address the privacy concerns that arise in
existing loyalty systems (see Section 2), but still of-
fer the users a full-fledged loyalty service, the proposed
uCentive scheme can be employed. Unlike in existing
systems, the users are issued with an anonymous creden-
tial at registration in order to participate in the scheme
(Section 4.3). The credential records their personal de-
tails, a serial number chosen by the issuer and the incen-
tives secret, which is only known by the user.
The loyalty points that the users are awarded with, are
earned through uCents, as described in Section 4.3. The
information about the number of awarded points and the
epoch are encoded in the info together with other infor-
mation allowing restrictions on the points redemption.
An example is the specification of a brand of products
for which the points may be utilised.
Loyalty system extensions, such as the family loyalty
are also possible. Namely, all family members can be
issued with credentials that have the same uCentive se-
cret, thus making the uCents earned by any of the mem-
bers linked to all of the credentials of the family group.
Earned uCents can be gathered in a joint storage and after
a sufficient amount of points is accumulated, any fam-
ily member can redeem them, as she can create the re-
quired proofs of knowledge with her credential. It is ad-
ditionally possible to record in the anonymous credential
whether a specific family member is allowed to redeem
uCents, or only earn them.
5.2 Privacy-preserving reputation
The proposed uCentive scheme can be utilised for ensur-
ing privacy in reputation systems for online communi-
ties. An example is the traffic and navigation app, Waze
[3], where users upload encountered traffic or road in-
formation. As the app is sending information about the
user’s location to the central provider, it is important not
to make different sessions of one user linkable. On the
other hand, it is desirable to allow users to collect points
for their participation of the scheme and potentially use
them to prove their seniority and reputation.
In this application, the users would establish a
pseudonym for every session or for every time interval.
The actions that they perform, such as reporting a traf-
fic jam, allow them to earn an incentive in the form of
a uCent. The earning protocol is executed after an ac-
tion is performed or at the end of a session, in which
case the service provider keeps a temporary account for
the user. The uCents that are earned encompass a link
with the credential of the user and allow her to accumu-
late reputation points. Each user holds a separate anony-
mous credential that records her reputation. After a suf-
ficient number of points is collected, a user can upgrade
her reputation by redeeming her uCents and having the
reputation credential updated in return. When an action
is performed by a user, such as issuing a report for the
other users to see it, the reporting user can disclose the
reputation she holds. This does not endanger the privacy
of the users, as for a large community, the information
about the reputation level usually does not reduce the
anonymity set significantly.
6 Experimental Analysis
In this section we present the details of our implemen-
tation of uCentive and we evaluate its performance. In
particular, our experimental analysis focuses on the exe-
cution times required by the earning and redeeming pro-
tocols in a smartphone for different configurations.
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# uCents tcom (ms) t1 (ms) t2 (ms) ttot (ms)
1 77.27 24.09 52.87 154.23
5 199.94 91.19 132.01 423.14
10 345.37 179.89 209.21 734.47
20 648.44 363.58 390.89 1402.91
Table 4: Average execution times for earning different number
of uCents in the S3 smartphone. The total time (ttot ) consists
of the time required to generate a commitment (tcom) and the
two steps of the PBS scheme (t1, t2).
6.1 Implementation
We implemented uCentive as a Java library compatible
with Android OS. The uCentive library’s API exposes
the earning and redeeming protocol operations for both
clients and servers (the transfer protocol will be available
in the near future). uCentive relies on Idemix version
2.3.4 [18] for anonymous credentials, commitments and
zero-knowledge proofs. In addition, we use our own de-
velopment framework, [obfuscated-for-submission], for
easier credential management and integration of per-
sistent storage and communication technologies. For
PBS support, we implemented the Abe and Okamoto
scheme [4] based on the C implementation by Jansen et
al. [19]. Furthermore, we have made our uCentive li-
brary implementation freely available to the community
for review and evaluation at the following location:
https://[obfuscated-for-submission]
We implemented two versions of the redeeming pro-
tocol: multi-proof and single-proof. In multi-proof re-
deeming, the client creates a non-interactive proof (i.e.
Idemix ProveCL and ProveCommitment [18]) for each
uCent to be redeemed. In single-proof redeeming, the
client creates only one non-interactive proof for all the
uCents to be redeemed.
Finally, we used our uCentive library to add loyalty
points capabilities to a full-fledged demonstrator, a mo-
bile shopping assistant app for Android. Using this app,
customers can earn and redeem loyalty points in privacy-
preserving way while buying items at a grocery store.
More details are presented in Appendix B.
6.2 Setup
We developed a prototype mobile client and server ap-
plication for our experimental evaluation. The mobile
application is compatible with Android 2.3 or higher.
We used two smartphones: a high-end and a medium-
range models. As high-end smartphone, we selected a
Samsung Galaxy S3 (GT-I9300) with a quad-core 1.4
GHz Cortex-A9 processor, 1GB of memory and Android
4.1.2. As medium-range smartphone, we selected a Sam-
sung Galaxy Ace 2 (I8160P) with dual-core 800 MHz
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Figure 1: Dependence of the client execution time on the
number of uCents earned using a high-end (S3) and mid-range
(Ace2) smartphones. The graph shows average values (n=100)
with 95% confidence intervals.
processor, 768 MB of memory and Android 2.3.6. We in-
stalled the uCentive-server component on a workstation
with a Intel® Core™ i7-3770 CPU, 16 GB of memory
and Ubuntu 13.04 (Linux 3.8.0). The smartphones com-
municated with the server over the Internet using Wi-Fi
and cellular data network.
Our tests used the standard Idemix system parameters:
ln = 1024 bits (RSA modulus), lΓ = 768 bits (commit-
ment group modulus), le = 597 bits (e values of certifi-
cates) and lv = 2048 bits (v values of the certificates).
In addition, we used an Idemix credential with 7 at-
tributes. For PBS, we used Schnorr-style parameters
with p = 1024 bits and q = 160 bits.
6.3 Performance Results
In our experiments, we measured the execution time in
the smartphones and the server for earning and redeem-
ing operations for an increasing number of uCents: 1,
3, 5, 10, 15 and 20. Only one denomination was used.
We relied on code instrumentation and the Stopwatch
class from the Guava library [17] to measure the exe-
cution times. A total of 100 tests per configuration were
performed; average values are reported with 95% con-
fidence intervals. Our results do not take into consider-
ation latencies introduced by the operating system and
network communications.
Earning protocol. For both smartphones, the earning
execution time increases linearly with the number of
uCents issued (Figure 1). For the Ace 2, the execution
time starts to increase at a faster rate when 20 uCents
were issued, probably due to hardware constraints. For
both devices, earning no more than 10 uCents can keep
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Figure 2: Dependence of client execution time on the num-
ber of uCents redeemed using a high-end (S3) and mid-range
(Ace2) smartphones and two redeem approaches. The graph
shows average values (n=100) with 95% confidence intervals.
execution time close to 1 second. These execution times
are appropriate for most incentive scenarios, as earning
and redeeming operations do not occur frequently (e.g.
once per transaction or action). To guarantee that a low
number of uCents are issued on each transaction, the
provider needs to select appropriate uCent’s denomina-
tions.
Table 4 presents more details about the different op-
erations that contribute to the total earning’s execution
time (ttot ). This time consists of the time required to
generate a commitment (tcom) and the two client steps
of the PBS scheme (t1 and t2, see Appendix A for more
details). To reduce the total execution time, it is possi-
ble to precompute the commitments before the earning
transaction without affecting privacy or security. Using
this approach, we can reduce the total execution time by
almost 50%. Another possible optimization is to omit
the verification of the PBS signature after completing the
protocol. In this way, t2 can be reduced to less than 1
ms, reducing the total execution time by almost 30%.
This approach, however, assumes that there is a low risk
that the service provider will produce bad PBS signatures
when issuing uCents.
On the server side, the execution time also increases
linearly with the number of uCents issued (Figure 3).
For example, for 1, 5 and 10 uCents, the average server
execution time was 7.51, 22.47 and 40.62 ms corre-
spondingly. These times are due mainly to the PBS
signature operations. Finally, we can conclude that
these execution times are appropriate for most applica-
tion servers.
Redeeming protocol. Our redeeming protocol should
be scalable, as in many scenarios, the service provider
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Figure 3: Dependence of server execution time on the num-
ber of uCents earned and redeemed. The graph shows average
values (n=100) with 95% confidence intervals.
cannot control how many uCents a user may want to re-
deem in a transaction. For example, a user may have
several low value uCents and decide to redeem them all
in one transaction.
Our results show that multi-proof redeeming is not a
scalable approach. For both smartphones, the total ex-
ecution time increased at a fast rate as we increased the
number of uCents to redeem (Figure 2). For example, for
10 uCents, the SG3 required 1.46 s and the Ace2 2.57
s. These larger execution times are due mainly to the
Idemix non-interactive proof, which includes a proof of
credential ownership (ProveCL) and a proof of commit-
ment to a credential’s attribute (ProveCommitment). The
problem is that, for a group of uCents both proofs are
computed for each uCent; however, only one ProveCL
proof is needed for the whole group. Therefore, we de-
vised the single-proof redeeming approach, where for a
group of n uCents, we compute only one ProveCL proof
and n ProveCommitment proofs. This approach provides
considerably better performance and scalability, as Fig-
ure 2 shows. For instance, for 10 uCents the average
execution times were 221.19 and 330.83 ms for the SG3
and Ace2 respectively (a reduction of around 85% when
compared with multi-proof). With single-proof, increas-
ing the number of uCents to redeem results in a small in-
crease of the execution time (i.e. tenths of ms). The rea-
son is that each ProveCommitment proof only requires
two modular exponentiations and one multiplication, as
opposed to the more complex operations required in the
ProveCL proof (see Idemix specification [18] for more
details). In short, we can conclude that single-proof re-
deeming can offer adequate scalability for most incentive
scenarios.
In addition, we can observe some variability in the val-
ues measured for both smartphones when using single-
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proof redeeming (i.e. the execution time did not always
increase with a larger number of uCents). This variabil-
ity is caused by changes in the state of the operating sys-
tem during each experiment, particularly the aggressive
behavior of Android’s garbage collector.
On the server side, we observed a similar behavior as
in the client side (Figure 3). That is, single-proof has bet-
ter performance and scalability than multi-proof redeem-
ing. As before, the reason is that the server only needs
to verify a single ProveCL proof and one ProveCom-
mitment proof per uCent with single-proof redeeming.
The execution times obtained with single-proof redeem-
ing are acceptable for an application server. For example,
redeeming 20 uCents requires approximately 108 ms.
7 Security and privacy discussion
This section is meant to evaluate the security and pri-
vacy properties of the proposed scheme against the de-
fined threat model. Additionally, it discusses design de-
cisions and possible extensions in the functionality of the
scheme.
7.1 Evaluation
User privacy. Unlinkability in the proposed scheme is
achieved by disallowing the service provider to link dif-
ferent user sessions through the interactions for earning
and redeeming uCents. This is achieved by creating a
fresh commitment to a secret attribute of the user’s cre-
dential for every uCent that is earned: C← Commit(ucs,
r), for a random value r (Table 1, step (3)). Further, this
commitment is not disclosed in the interaction for earn-
ing the uCent, cf. step (4). A partially blind signature
scheme is utilised, which allows hiding the commitment,
while allowing the service provider to verify additional
information that is included in the signature. Therefore,
when the uCent is redeemed, it is unlinkable to the earn-
ing session, despite the disclosure of the commitment
value, as illustrated in Table 2, step (4).
As an additional level of privacy protection, the
scheme achieves perfect forward unlinkability. This
means that if the user credential is compromised, the
previous interactions of the user within the uCentive
scheme cannot be linked to that credential. Every earned
uCent contains a commitment C to the uCentive-secret
from the user’s credential, which links it to the user her-
self: uCent = {C, r, info, PBSig}. The commitment
C and its opening information r are utilised when the
uCent is redeemed, but the opening information is not
disclosed to the provider. Finally, if a user deletes the
opening information after redeeming a uCent, unavail-
ability of r makes it impossible to extract the uCentive-
secret from the commitment value. Therefore, even if the
user’s credential is compromised and the uCentive-secret
is leaked, it would not be linkable to any of the previous
user interactions.
Security of the scheme. The proposed scheme is resis-
tant to theft of the issued incentives. The attackers that
try to claim valid, but misappropriated uCents are not
able to succeed, as they do not have the uCents’ owner’s
credential. The credential is needed to create zero-
knowledge proofs required to redeem the uCents. As
shown in Table 2, step (3), a user must posses an anony-
mous credential CredU with the appropriate uCentive-
secret ucs in order to claim a uCent = {C, r, info, PBSig},
by providing the required proofs: ZKPK{(ucs, r): C =
gucs × hr ∧C.ucs= CredU .ucs }.
The protection of service providers’ interests is also
achieved with the uCentive scheme, as the double-
spending and forging of uCents is prevented. A suc-
cessful forging attempt would require access to the se-
cret signing key of the provider, which is assumed to
be unattainable. Similarly, as the provider maintains a
database of the revealed commitments, an attempt to re-
deem a uCent twice would be detected (Table 2, step (5)).
In addition, the service providers can impose sup-
plementary restrictions on the redemption of incentives.
When a new uCent is issued, the public part of the signed
data, denoted as info, is created by the service provider
(step (1) in Table 1). This information can be utilised for
specifying limitations on the issued incentives, such as
the validity period or services for which the benefits are
applicable. Once the uCent is issued, it is not possible to
change the info specification, which is ensured through
the security of the partially blind signature scheme [4].
Finally, there is a threat that some users are willing to
share their credentials in order to earn or redeem points
for each other. However, they can be discouraged from
doing so. Existing credential sharing disincentivising
schemes can be utilised for that. Examples are including
a personal and sensitive attribute in the credential that a
user does not want to disclose, such as her credit card
number.
7.2 Design extensions
In order to ensure the unlinkability of the transactions
within the uCentive scheme, it should not be possible
to associate different sessions for earning and redemp-
tion of uCents. As the commitments that are linking the
issued uCent to the user’s credential are disclosed at re-
demption time, they are hidden from the provider when
a uCent is earned. The hiding is accomplished through
the partially blind signature scheme. However, due to the
way the commitment is blinded in the signing protocol, it
is not possible to prove properties about it [4]. Still, it is
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possible to utilise other methods to introduce assurance
for the service provider that the incentive is issued to the
right party. The method that can be utilised is cut-and-
choose technique. This means that when the protocol is
executed, the users provides the service provider with a
number of commitments which is higher than the number
of uCents that need to be issued. The provider then chal-
lenges the user to unblind a random selection of blinded
commitments that will not be used for issuing uCents.
The user is then able to prove that these commitments
are created with the uCentive-secret from her credential.
This uCentive scheme also allows for provision of ac-
countability. When a uCent is redeemed, the user can
provide a verifiable encryption of some identifying at-
tributes from her credential, encrypted with the public
key of a trusted third party. This information is recorded
with other transcript details, so that if a misuse is de-
tected, it is used to deanonymise the perpetrator. Fur-
thermore, this approach allows to have offline operation
of the redemption part of the scheme. Namely, the ba-
sic flavour of the scheme, for redemption of a uCent, it
is necessary to check the database for used commitnents,
in order to prevent double-spending. However, if the user
provides a verifiable encryption of some identifying at-
tributes from her credential when redeeming a uCent, the
check for double-spending detection can be deferred for
a later time. The trade-off that needs to be made with this
approach is that it does not provide prevention of double
spending, while it is still detectable and the perpetrator
can be identified.
Finally, in order to add another layer of control of user
participation in the scheme, existing techniques for re-
vocation of credentials can be introduced. However, as
there are other ways of countering misbehaviour, it is not
required for the service provider to employed the revoca-
tion scheme.
8 Related Work
The privacy of the incentives systems is explored in the
literature in the contexts of reputation systems and loy-
alty schemes. In reputation systems, users obtain incen-
tives for actions they perform and then utilise them for
upgrading their reputation. Ideally, the issued reputation
incentives should be linked to the user who is perform-
ing the actions. However, linking the actions that con-
tribute to a reputation is a threat to user privacy. To ad-
dress this issue, there are initiatives to develop privacy-
preserving reputation systems. Initial solutions are based
on pseudonymity of users [25]. Even though the iden-
tities of users are not disclosed, these approaches still
allow linking of user’s actions which contributed to her
reputation. Some later proposals are based on the exist-
ing e-cash systems [20, 11]. For instance, Elli et al. [5]
describe a reputation system for peer-to-peer networks.
In this scheme, users exchange reputation coins, which
are anonymously spent with a bank to acquire a repu-
tation token. An important drawback is that there is no
strong coupling between the issued reputation tokens and
the intended receiver. The users are able to sell their rep-
utation tokens and stolen coins can also freely be used by
an attacker to upgrade her reputation. Another approach
based on e-cash is proposed by Camenisch et al. [10].
The proposed scheme ensures privacy-preserving incen-
tives delivery and can be extended to building reputa-
tion. The users retrieve electronic coins from a bank and
offer them through an online collaboration system (e.g.
Wikipedia) to contributing users. Using pseudonyms that
are specific to a domain or a document to which they con-
tribute, the users’ actions are not linkable over domains.
However, the coins that are obtained are not linked to the
contributor’s pseudonym. They can thus be easily trans-
ferred to other users, without it being controlled by the
central system. That means that a user who has gathered
reputation tokens can easily delegate or sell them to an-
other user.
Another privacy-preserving reputation scheme for in-
formation dissemination in mobile peer-to-peer networks
was proposed by Voss et al. [26]. However, there is no
notion of unlinkability in their scheme, which signifi-
cantly limits the applicability of the proposal. Another
approach requires usage of trusted hardware modules,
such as smart cards, in order to benefit from a reputation
scheme [8]. Such approach can be cumbersome for the
users as it requires possession of an additional device.
In the context of loyalty systems, the proposals typi-
cally focus on unlinkability of different points gathering
sessions. In [21] Marquardt et al. propose to have a batch
of loyalty cards available to users for anonymous down-
load. This corresponds to usage of one-off pseudonyms,
but defeats the purpose of measuring user loyalty. On the
other hand, a solution proposed by Enzmann and Schnei-
der [16] uses blind signatures to avoid linking the points
issuance and redemption sessions. Even though the users
can collect loyalty points, there is no robust mechanism
that prevents them from sharing or merging their loyalty
points. Additionally, in both approaches, there is no op-
tion for a retailer to record any data, even with user con-
sent.
By applying the approach described in this work to
the reputation or incentives system, it is achieved that
the actions of users are not linkable. In addition, by
using the extended scheme design described in Section
7.2, we ensure that exclusively the user behind the ac-
tions is awarded with the incentive. Furthermore, unlike
in the previous schemes, the flexibility of the informa-
tion within the issued incentives allows imposing flex-
ible constraints on the usage of incentives, such as the
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expiration period.
9 Conclusions and future work
This paper proposes uCentive, a scheme for unlinkable
earning, redemption and transfer of incentives. It is de-
signed to allow users to remain anonymous and have
their actions unlinkable, while participating in the incen-
tives system. The protocols are based on anonymous cre-
dentials and partially blind signatures. The scheme is ap-
plicable to services where user privacy is of importance.
At the same time, the service provider is able to impose
restrictions on the usage or transfer of incentives.
Two practical use cases are described. Utilisation of
the uCentive scheme is demonstrated in the context of
the loyalty systems and the reputation system in online
communities. The scheme has been implemented on
Android-based smartphones and the performance evalua-
tion demonstrates its high efficiency. As future work, we
will extend the scheme with a cut-and-choose technique
to allow the service provider to verify that the uCents are
issued to the correct user. Also, the publicly available
uCentive-library will be extended with the protocol for
transferring uCents between users.
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A uCentive Earning Protocol with PBS details
Shared information: g, p, q, y = gx, info, hash functionF
Information held by the Service Provider: secret key skSP = x
Information held by the User: usc, hash functionH
Service Provider User
Choose uCent value and epoch
u,s,d ∈R Zq
z :=F (info), info = value‖epoch‖additional restrictions
a := ga,b := gszd
a, b−−−−−−−−−−−−→
t1, t2, t3, t4,rc ∈R Zq
C = Commit(ucs,rc) = gucshrc
z =F (info)
α = agt1 yt2
β = bgt3 zt4
ε =H (α‖β‖z‖C)
e = ε− t2− t4 mod q
e←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
c = e−d mod q
r = u− cx mod q
(r, c, s, d)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
ρ = r+ t1 mod q
ω = c+ t2 mod q
σ = s+ t3 mod q
δ = d + t4 mod q
ω+δ ?=H (gρyω‖gσ zδ ‖z‖C)
PBSig : (ρ,ω,σ ,δ )
Store(uCent= {PBSig,C,rc,value,epoch})
Operations:
x‖y: concatenation of strings x and y
H (x): SHA-1 hash of x
F (x): hash of x calculated as D(x)
p−1
q ,where p and q are prime numbers and q | (p−1)
Commit(x,r) : commitment to value x with random opening value r, calculated as C = gx1×gr2 [24]
The user–service provider interaction for earning a uCent for an incentive defined with value and epoch (and other
possible usage restrictions). This diagram shows the integration of the partially blind signature scheme (PBS) by Abe
and Okamoto [4] with uCentive’s earning protocol. uCentive’s exclusive operations are presented in boldface.
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B A Privacy-friendly Shopping Assistant App using uCentive
(a) Initial screen (b) Redeeming loyalty points (c) Earning loyalty points
We used our uCentive Java library to add loyalty points support to a privacy-friendly shopping assistant app for An-
droid. This app allows customers to do groceries shopping with their smartphones, receive customized advertisements,
recommendations and coupons, keep a local customer profile and participate in the store’s loyalty program in a privacy-
preserving way. Customers earn loyalty points each time they complete a transaction with the store (c). Loyalty points
as well as credential secrets and customer profile data are stored in the smartphone in an encrypted database. Cus-
tomers can redeem loyalty points in exchange for a discount during checkout (b). Our preliminary user studies show
that the application has acceptable response times despite of the overhead added by our privacy-preserving protocols.
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